Introduction
Victor Gomez-Pin highlighted succincty one object of the second Congress on Ontology held in San Sebastián and Barcelona in March of 1996 -by raising two questions due to Husserl about Descartes, namely: is there a persistent value to Descarte's most basic ideas? And if so, can they stimulete new, powerful ideas in our era? Indeed, one of the most interesting and fundamental puzzles that Descartes was the first to face with any success is the nature of the connections between mind and body, and the relevance of mathematics to both. It was the physicist Eugene Wigner, however, who called it the "unreasonable" elfectiveness of mathematics, by which he had in mind above all the powerful applications of mathematics to physics, which have proven crucial for the advance of modem science.1 The Greeks showed and early interest in these most basic questions of ontology and eplstemology, and from the an¬ swers given by such ligures as the Pythagoreans and Plato in antiquity, it is clear that mathematics played a fundamental part in their analysis and understanding of nature. Two millenia later, Galileo described his own similar point of view as follows:
[The book of Nature] is written in the language of mathematics, and its characters are triangles, circles and other geometric figures without which it is humanly impossible to undestand a single word of it; without these, one wanders about in a dark labyrinth.2 Nature is mathematical, or may be explored and understood mathematically, because math¬ ematics is the language of nature. But if so, this immediately suggests another question: where does the language come from? Galileo believed that the world was created using mathematics -and as far back as the Greeks, it was assumed that the universe was constructed according to the ratios and proportions of geometry, that all of nature proceeds therefore according to number, weight and measure: Nonetheless, the approach taken here in exploring the question of why mathematics should be so elfective in the exploration of nature is somewhat dillerent from Galileo's. Going back to the title, "The Unreasonable Elfectiveness of Mathematics: Cartesian Linguistics, the Mind-Body Problem and Pragmatic Evolution," the mention of "Cartesian Linguistics" is a reference to ideas associated with the linguist Noam Chomsky, the "Mind-Body Problem" recalls immediately the philosopher Descartes, and "Pragmatic Evolution" is associated with the father of Prgamatism, Charles S. Peirce. Each of these, as will become apparent, is specially relevant to the subject of this study devoted to ontology in general, but to Descartes in particular-and above all, to the questions considered in the following, mamely questions about mathematics and the reasons why it has proven so powerful in the study and explication of nature. In what follows, attention will be devoted primarily to the American father of Prag¬ matism, Charles S. Peirce Lather, Peirce described this incident in detail to his friend, the Harvard philosopher and phychologist William James ( 1842 James ( -1910 .5 He did so because he had come to regard the story as an excellent example of what he called the logic of abduction. He also described this as the "inclination to entertain an hypothesis", which served to explain "why it is that people so often guess right". This in turn was intimately connected with Peirce's philosophy of science, for he viewed abduction as the key to understanding the nature of scientific knowledge and how it is obtained. Peirce described the formation of a hypothesis as "an act of insight", the "abductive suggestion"coming tu us "like a flash".6 There was another principle at work as well, one re-3 The version presented here is derived from Peirce's own manuscript account, "Guessing", Houghton MS CSP 687. This manuscript actually contains two different versions of the story, separately paginated, the earlier in a clearer hand, the other (presumably later) in a less steady hand, but with more detail. The stoiy was first publish¬ ed (as his papers were being readied for publication) in a Harvard University magazine. The Hound and Horn, Peirce 1929 . It is also mentioned briefly in Peirce 1958, 7, 7.36-48 Thus animal spirits from the brain are conveyed through a nerve to the arm muscle which then inflates, producing the intended motion. Although Descarte's explanation is rather crude in its way, the modem theory of reflex action may be said to begin with his primitive concept of afferent and efferent components.9
Santiago Ramón y Cajal (1852 Cajal ( -1934 What Descartes was in no position to appreciate was the importance of the brain's micro-struc¬ ture, its neural anatomy, nor did he elaborate a sufficiently detailed theory of brain localization.
As for the brain's neuro-anatomy, Santiago Ramón y Cajal once described the nerve cell as "The aristocrat among the structures of the body, with its giant arms stretched out like the ten¬ tacles of an octopus to the provinces on the outside word, to watch for the constant ambushes of physical and chemical forces".10 It was Ramón y Cajal who discovered in 1871 that neurons could be selectively stained with a special silver preparation. Although the method picks out only one in a hundred cells, it monetheless stains the entire neuron body, along with all its proc¬ esses, thus setting it apart for easy examination. This maxim is announced by Holmes in the course of a remarkable story involving stolen plans for the Bnice-Partington submarine, top-secret at the turn of the century, which first appeared in Doyle 1908. It is repro¬ duced in Baring-Gould 1967, vol. 2, pp. Other neurologists have also contributed to our growing understanding of brain function using allied but complementary means. For example, studies of brain lesions have been used to locate regions associated with impaired abilities, enabling identification of areas for long-term memory as opposed to short-term memory, as well as areas designated for number and melody.
Micro-structures and neuro-anntomy While macro-structure anatomy of the sort perfected by Penfield and his colleagues has led to increasingly refined understanding of the brain's topology, studies of the micro-structure of neurons and neuro-anatomy have been equally significant. Here one of the major problems in cortical histology has been the nature of the connections and interaction between an axon and the cell to wich it discharges its impulses. At The emergence of the capacity to learn is the triumph of evolution... A primary requirement of any ani¬ mal is that it should be able to anticipate changes in its environment. Inherited reflexes contain a sta¬ tic description of the events of high probability in the past experience of the species, but learning allows each animal to add a stock of personal secrets to its description of the probabilities of the world.
To anticipate the future is the ultimate goal of the evolution of the nervous system.35
In turn, Blakemore relates this directly with language:
As with words, the structure of grammar reveals the machinery of the human mind... In his revolu¬ tionary theory of syntax, Noam Chomsky claimed that people have within them an innate, universal system of syntax which makes them competent to learn to understand and to generate speech. This knowledge is the prerequisite for any human language. It comprises the laws govern the formation of elementary sentences; these "deep structures" are prepositional descriptions...36
Or, as Chomsky himself has explained:
The central doctrine of Cartesian linguistics is that the general features of grammatical structure are common to all languages and reflect certain fundamental properties of the mind... The study of the universal conditions that prescribe the form of any human language is "grammaire générale". The brain gains its knowledge by a process analogous to the inductive reasoning of the classical scien¬ tific method. Neurons present arguments to the brain based on the specific features that detect, argu¬ ments on w hich the brain constructs its hypothesis of perception.38
Mathematics, logic and neuro-anatomy Needham, who has been especially concerned with connections between mathematics, logic, and neuroanatomy, begins with the premise that thoughts represent the formalization of factual states of affairs. Pure mathematics and symbolic logic may be regarded as formal processes. But the formal relations of mathematics also seem to be independent of actual objects, and hence, in their formal sense, independent of sense perception. Even if our knowledge of them is a priori rather a posteriori, in order to comunícate this mathematical knowledge, "common" or familiar "conversational" language has developed chiefly as a means of communicating pos¬ sibilities. A "formal" language like symbolic logic, however, is meant to be much stricter, and is expected to include all propositons, tautologies, and contradictions. Because of its rigidly for¬ mal nature, pure mathematics is inherently different from familiar "conversational" language.
There must, therefore, be a difference in the manner by which the nervous system repre¬ sents a priori information, the information of necessary fomialations, from the representation 35 Mathematics and the brain It may be that the first and most basic concepts of mathematics begin with the recognition of one's own identity as distinct from all other objects, which amounts to self-awareness. Selfawareness may in turn be understood as a kind of recursive thinking. On this view, computers may be said to be conscious in at least a very limited sense, but with only one or two addition¬ al levels of self-awareness, they could also be considered to be just as "conscious" as human beings. For example, a disk operating system (DOS) is aware of typed input and responds accordingly. When a computer is switched on, it first undertakes a series of internal checks to make sure that its memory is functioning properly. This process may be taken as fist-order or a very primitive level of self-awareness. If another level is added -a parallel-or sub-pro¬ cessor perhaps which monitors the disk operanting system or the internal checks it makesand if on this higher level the computer where asked what "it", i.e. the computer, was doing, the computer would reply that "it" was either responding to DOS commands or making a series of internal checks. Adding yet another level of self-awareness -video cameras perhaps, with which the computer could view itself as distinct from other objects around it-imagine how the computer would then respond if queried, now able to report where it was in its evironment and what it was doing? Would this be consciousness?
Some argue that humans are not only aware of what they are doing, but are also aware that they are aware, and that it is precisely this that makes us "conscious". On the other hand, after a few layers of recursive awareness have been added, the level of actual self-awareness becomes meaningless, that is, it makes no sense to say that "I am aware that I am aware that I am aware that 1 am aware" is any more "aware" than some one or thing saying "... I am aware that I am aware that I am aware that I am aware". Therefore, with only a few levels of recursi¬ ve awareness, the computer may well be said to be "self-aware", and perhaps just as much selfaware as any human being.30 I will not consider any further here the question of whether computers may be self-aware or not, but go to suggest that once a being is self aware, as with a computer recognizing itself as different from the objects around it, then in turn it can begin to recognize other objects as being separate and therefore "countable". From this self-realization -a sort of cogito ergo sum-the concept of numbers arises. In this case, the number concept is a priori in the sense that we cannot be aware of it unless we have self-consciousness first. The a priori nature of numbers may well be related to the evolutionary history of the structure of the universe, made up of conglomerates of atoms which by nature of the environmental separations around them lend themselves to being seen as individual countable objects by our consciousness, leading thereafter to higher and more complex structures.
The actual neuronal structure of the brain that account for counting is probably related to the logic in the "chaotic" organization of neural netwoks in the brain. Recent neuro-anatoniical research has shown that neuronal hardwiring in the brain actually follows chaotic patterns, that is, although appearing to be random or chaotic, they actually follow fractal patterns according to the rules of chaos which determine neuronal w iring. This hard wiring is influenced by sen¬ sory stimulation during the first two years of life; without it, with no stimulation during that time, the hard wiring never develops. From then on, sensory stimulation affects the "weighting" of neuronal connections between neurons in the neural networks, probably by a process known as "long term potentiation".
All this means that the hard-wiring of the neurological networks in the brain, which occurs during the first few years of life, are crucial. Part of the hard-wiring in the left parietal cortex allows us to count based on a complex but essentially binary output neural network. Subsequently, a simple memory system makes it possible to accomplish basic arithmetic. Idiot savants simply make use of this capability to an unusually high degree.
With the capacity to count, mathematical abilities help to describe the real, external world. This external reality presents itself as discreet objects which lend themselves to counting. The leap from counting to the laws of physics may be formidable, but perhaps reasonable after all, and undeniably effective as the history of science makes clear.
There is a remarkable symmetry between the quantum nature of physics, which in its most reduced form involves countable particles which combine to make up the almost (and perhaps) infinitely complex universe, just as neurons concatenate to form the almost infinite number of neural connections within our own brains.
Conclusion
Ultimately, the integration of mind and body may all be referred back to the insights Descartes offered on the essential connection between res cogitaos and res extensa. Even though Descartes may have been wrong about the pineal gland serving as a king of biochemical cen¬ tral processing unit, he was nevertheless correct in the major outline he offered, suggesting that our knowledge of the external world is ultimately and inextricably seated in the biology of the brain.
Peirce, pragmatism, and evolution Charles Sanders Peirce, the American Pragmatist, realized that both the laws of nature and the structures of our brains -which find ever more ingenious ways of apprehending and interpret¬ ing nature's laws -w ere the products of evolution. This was ultimately the secret to the ans¬ wer Peirce gave to his question about why we so often guess right? How had he managed to guess who had stolen his gold watch? Above all, why from all of the infinite possibilities is science able to isolate the most relevant factors necessary to provide ever more accurate scien¬ tific theories?
The mind of man has been formed under the action of the laws of nature, and therefore it is not so very surprising to find that its constitution is such that, w hen we can get rid of caprices, idiosyncrasies, and other perturbations, its thoughts naturally show a tendency to agree with the law s of nature.31 Hence, the mind is able to apprehend nature because it is itself a result of the forces and relationships in nature that have been instrumental in its evolutionary construction at every 31 C.S. Peirce, "The Proper Treatment of Hypotheses (A Preliminary Chapter, Toward an Examination of Hume's Argument Against Miracles, in its Logic and in its History), "Houghton MS CSP 692; and "flume's Arguments Against Miracles, and the Idea of Natural Law", Houghton MS CSP 873, transcribed in Peirce 1985, vol. 2, pp. 890-904, esp. p. 901. step. This is exactly what Noam Chomsky suggested in sayind that by the time evolution had produced the brain of Homo Sapiens Sapiens, the modern human brain had been structured in an a priori way as a result of that evolution, creating in the process a template with certain taxo¬ nòmic categories awaiting initialization.
Unfortunately, human knowledge is not a priori in the sense that we simply wake up one day speaking Chinese -or solving differential equations. What is given, and a priori in this sense, is the brain itself, its complex neural networks and its seemingly infinite potential to res¬ pond to successful learning accumulated over millennia. In the short term, the brain is con¬ stantly exploring new strategies leading to new models and possibilities for both investigating and justifying new knowledge, apparently without limit.
With proper training in the early years of childhood, the brain is responsive to language and to mathematics. In the absence of appropriate initial stimulation, however, those structures apparently atrophy and it soon becomes impossible to establish neural pathways. On the other hand, once in place, as the human brain begins to grow and develop, it eventually discovers the unexpected, perhaps unreasonable effectiveness of those structures to provide models-of lan¬ guage, of mathematics, and of spatio-temporal relations in general.
As Descartes said, cogito, ergo sum, but without the ability to perceive oneself, and in turn to distinguish the one from the many, the first steps towards numbering and the successive hierarchy of mathematics from the discrete to the continuous, from the finite to the infinite, 
